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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed in a criminal

case. All the convictions should be reversed because of the numerous trial and evidentiary
errors made by the court. Those errors include the court's error in denying the defense request
for an adequate written summary of expected testimony from the state's expert witness, error in
admitting emails, text messages and an audio recording without sufficient foundation, and the
admission of irrelevant evidence.
B.

The Charge
Michael Koch (pronounced "Coe") was charged by indictment with four counts of Lewd

Conduct with a Minor under Sixteen in violation ofLC. § 18-1508. All counts named the
complaining witness as "C.c." Count I alleged the crime was committed "by manual to genital
and/or oral to genital contact" between January and May 2011. CR 26-27. Counts II - IV all
alleged genital to genital contact in April 2011. Id.
The state filed a "Notice ofIntent to Use LR.E. 404 and LC.R. 16." The Notice stated
that "in Count I, the State alleges acts of manual to genital and/or oral to genital contact. The
State hereby provides notice that it intends to introduce testimony that these [sic] were multiple
acts of manual to genital and/or genital contact during January to April 2011." CR 74-75.
C.

Summary of Trial Proceedings
Specific facts relating to the Issues on Appeal will be discussed in detail in the Argument

section below. The following is intended only as a short summary of the evidence presented at
trial.

C.C. was a friend of Tori Koch, the daughter of Mr. Koch. e.C. and Tori were both Girl
Scouts and Salina Koch, Mr. Koch's wife, was a Girl Scout leader. C.C. was at the Koch's home
frequently. Her parents were recently divorced and prior to her mom leaving the home, "there
was lots of drinking, lots of screaming, lots of yelling and then lots of isolation." In short, her
parents were "a disaster." Her home life was "not good ... at all," and there were times her "dad
wouldn't talk" to her. T pg. 281, In. 8-19. When her mom left the house she was both
"infuriated" and "heart-broken." T pg. 281, In. 23-24. In contrast, she felt that there "was a lot
oflove" in the Koch home which "she hadn't experienced at [her] home[.]" T pg. 293, In. 9-12.
C.C. testified to multiple instances of conduct which could have been found to constitute
the charge in Count I, i.e., manual-genital and/or oral-genital contact occurring between January
and May 2011. C.e. also testified to three specific instances of sexual intercourse. The first two
were on the same day. The third was a few weeks later during an evening when Tori and Ms.
Koch were at a play. T pg. 321, In. 16 - pg. 326, In. 13. C.C. testified all instances of
intercourse occurred after spring break but before the end ofthe school year, T pg. 319, In. 8-10,
placing them in May 2011. Exhibits pg. 37. She did not report any of the events until late
September or early October of2011, after she was admitted to Intermountain Hospital. T pg.
356, In. 18-23. The state also played an audio recording of a "confront call" allegedly between

c.c. and Mr. Koch.

The person identified as Mr. Koch does not admit any of the accusations

made against him by e.e., but also does not deny them. State's Exhibit 19; T Vol. III, pg. 35, In.
1.

Mr. Koch testified that he did not have sexual intercourse with e.C. T Vol. Ill, pg. 138,
In. 23-25. The defense theory of the case was that C.C.'s false report of sexual abuse was an
2

attention-getting device. Her admission to Intermountain Hospital was the result of a feigned
suicide attempt which only involved superficial scratches to her wrists and her report of sexual
abuse while there was motivated by her need for more attention from her parents. T Vol. III, pg.
100, In. 3 - pg. 101, In. 11.
There were no independent witnesses to any of these events, nor was there any forensic
evidence supporting C.C.'s testimony about the events.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts. CR 181-185.
D.

Post-Trial Proceedings

The district court sentenced Mr. Koch to four twenty-five-year sentences with five years
fixed on each count. All the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. CR 200-201.
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. CR 216.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Did the court err by denying Mr. Koch's discovery request for a written summary of
expected testimony along with the facts and data supporting that opinion from the state's expert
witness?
B. Did one ofthe many trial and evidentiary errors by the court deprive Mr. Koch of his

constitutional due process right to a far trial?
1. Did the court err in denying Mr. Koch's objection during opening
statements?

2. Did the court err in admitting a text message allegedly from Mr. Koch
to Lisa Conn due to lack of foundation?
3. Did the court err in admitting irrelevant evidence that Mr. Koch did not
enjoy oral sex with his wife?
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4. Did the court err in admitting irrelevant evidence that c.c. decided to
not attend the special charter school she was admitted to because she did not want
to see members of the Koch family there?
5. Did the court err in admitting emails and text messages allegedly from
Mr. Koch to c.c. due to lack of foundation?
6. Did the court err by failing to strike non-responsive testimony?
7. Did the court err by admitting evidence of prior statements for purposes of
impeachment where the witness did not deny making the prior statement?
8. Did the court err by admitting the audio recording of a "confront call" due to
lack of foundation?
C. Alternatively, did the cumulative effect ofthe above errors deprive Mr. Koch of a fair
trial?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The Court Erred by Failing to Require the State to Comply with LC.R. J6(b)(7)
1. Facts pertaining to argument
Mr. Koch filed a Request for Discovery and asked that the state provide him all material

to which he was entitled under LC.R. 16. CR 3. The state filed a notice with the court asserting
that it had "complied with the Defendant's Request for Discovery." CR 55.
At the pretrial conference on April 25, 2012, the defense noted that it would object to the
proposed testimony of Mydell Yeager, an expert witness. The court said that the objection could
be addressed at the next pretrial conference. T Vol. I, pg. 40, In. 4-9.
On April 27, 2012, the state filed a List of Potential Trial Witnesses, which included
Mydell Yeager. CR 90-9]. And on May 2, 2012, Mr. Koch filed his Third Specific Request for
Discovery wherein he asked the state to produce "a written summary or report of any and all
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testimony that the State intends to introduce at trial in this matter, pursuant to Rule 702, 703, or
705, Idaho Rules of Evidence, including but not limited to the witness's opinions, the facts and
basis of those opinions, and the witness's qualification." CR 95-96.
At the second pretrial conference, the state argued that it had substantially complied with
the specific discovery request. It read its expert witness disclosure into the record:
Ms. Yeager's curriculum vitae is attached. She'll testifY to the dynamics of
delayed disclosure as it relates to child sexual abuse. The state intends to elicit
expert testimony from Mydell Yeager regarding behavior of children who have
been sexually abused and Ms. Yeager will testifY that it is rare that a child
immediately discloses their sexual abuse especially when they know the
perpetrator. Ms. Yeager will testifY about the dynamics of child sexual abuse as it
relates to grooming a victim, keeping the abuse secret, the effect of threats on
whether a child chooses to disclose.
T Vol. I, pg. 48, In. 12-25; pg. 49, In. 2-3. Defense counsel argued that the state had not
substantially complied because the above paragraph was not a written summary report of the
expert's expected testimony. T Vol. I, pg. 50, In. 3-6. The court stated that the state was "not
required to produce a written report if she didn't have a written report." T Vol. I, pg. 49, In. 7-8.
The court noted that if the expert's testimony varied from the state's disclosure the defense could
object. T Vol. I, pg. 50, In. 17-21.
Mr. Koch renewed his objection just prior to Ms. Yeager's testimony. He argued that
while the state had "provided a summary of what they, the state, intends to elicit from the witness
of the opinion, the state did not provide the facts and data for these opinions." T pg. 691, In 312. He further argued that he was not able to effectively cross-examine the witness without that
information. !d. The court overruled the objection stating, "ifthere is no data, they don't have to
produce data. She is simply an opinion witness." T pg. 693, In. 693, In. 5-8. Defense counsel
responded that "the data that we want is the data for her underlying opinion, not the data from
5

this case." The court said that counsel "had been given a list of the studies upon which she has
relied. There's no independent data that is created in order for her to have these opinions," and
again overruled the objection. T pg. 693, In. 18-25. In fact, it appears that the state did not
provide a list of studies. The prosecutor told the court that it had provided a written summary,
Ms. Mydell's CV, and her contact information, but did not mention a list of studies relied upon.
T pg. 691, In. 23 - pg. 693, In. 1.
During the direct examination of Ms. Yeager, she testified that there are "certain phases
that kids go through in that whole process of sexual abuse[.]" T pg. 697, In. 23-25. She testified
that there is an engagement phase, a sexual interaction phase, a secrecy phase and a disclosure
phase. Sometimes the disclosure is accidental or comes after independent discovery of the abuse,
but sometimes the child discloses in order to get it to stop. T pg. 706, In. 14 - pg. 708, In. 5.
She was then asked:
Q. In your experience as a counselor, is it your experience that delayed disclosure
[of sexual abuse] is more common or less common?

A: It's extremely common. It's so rare that kids will be abused one time and
come forward immediately following that, that it's got to be well below five
percent in the population. Most - most always it's a delayed disclosure.
T pg. 708, In. 15-22. Ms. Yeager also testified that sometimes children disclose because of an
overwhelming sense of shame or humiliation. T pg. 708, In. 23 - pg. 709, In. 10.
When asked on cross-examination where the data to support her opinion about delayed
disclosures came from, she said "It comes from lots and lots of different data. You know,
Suzanne Sgroi writes about it. There is lots published and lots of documents about that." T Vol.
II, pg. 27, In. 16-21.
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2. Why relief should be granted
The court erred by failing to order the state to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7),
which provides that:
Upon written request of the defendant the prosecutor shall provide a written
summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce pursuant to
Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing. The
summary provided must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and data for
those opinions, and the witness's qualifications. Disclosure of expert opinions
regarding mental health shall also comply with the requirements ofI.C. § 18-207.
The prosecution is not required to produce any materials not subject to disclosure
under paragraph (f) of this Rule. This subsection does not require disclosure of
expert witnesses, their opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, or the
witness's qualifications, intended only to rebut evidence or theories that have not
been disclosed under this Rule prior to trial.
As Mr. Koch made a written request, the state here was required to: 1) describe Ms. Yeager's
opinions; 2) describe the facts and data for the opinions; and 3) provide the witness's
qualifications. ld. It complied with the third requirement, as it provided a copy of Ms. Yeager's
curriculum vitae, but did not comply with the first or second requirements.
The summary that she will testify "about the dynamics of child sexual abuse as it relates
to grooming a victim, keeping the abuse secret, the effect of threats on whether a child chooses to
disclose" merely states the topic that Ms. Yeager will testify to. It tells us nothing about what
Ms. Yeager's opinion about what the dynamics of child sexual abuse might be, or her opinion as
to the effect of threats on whether a child chooses to disclose within that context.
The summary that Ms. Yeager would "testify to the dynamics of delayed disclosure as it
relates to child sexual abuse" does not disclose what her opinions on that topic might be. This
summary tells us the area about which Ms. Yeager plans to testify but does not summarize what
her testimony will be. It also failed to inform Mr. Koch of what facts and data Ms. Yeager would
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be relying upon for her testimony.
The summary that she will "testifY regarding behavior of children who have been sexually
abused" and say that "it is rare that a child immediately discloses their sexual abuse especially
when they know the perpetrator" does set forth an opinion. However, it again fails to inform Mr.
Koch of what facts and data Ms. Yeager was relying upon for her testimony.
In particular, these summaries did not inform Mr. Koch about Ms. Yeager's eventual
testimony about the four phases of sexual abuse, nor of her testimony of the reasons why children
eventually disclose, nor of her testimony that sometimes children disclose because of an
overwhelming sense of shame or humiliation. Nor did they set out any of the facts and data Ms.
Yeager relied upon. As it turned out, all Ms. Yeager could manage when asked about the facts
and data was that she relied "upon lots and lots of different data," and failed to name any other
source by name other than Suzanne Sgroi. T Vol. II, pg. 27, In. 1821. Had the state been
required to disclose the writing of Suzanne Sgroi or any of the other publications, defense
counsel could have determined how Ms. Sgroi came up with her opinions, whether she and the
unnamed other authors were in the mainstream of opinion on the topic, whether their opinions
were supported by facts and data, whether those writings had been peer reviewed and whether to
obtain expert assistance to rebut Ms. Yeager's testimony.
One of the purposes for requiring disclosure of expert opinions and the facts and data
underlying the opinion is to permit the defendant an opportunity to prepare effective crossexamination. It is important to know what the opinion will be in order to determine whether
there are experts who disagree with that opinion. It is important to know the facts and data that
underlie the opinion in order to determine whether the facts and data support the expert's opinion
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or if the facts and data are in dispute or in error. It is also important to know what the expert did
not consider in forming her opinion. "The right to cross-examine an expert concerning the basis
for the expert's opinion includes the right to cross-examine concerning matters the expert did not
take into account." D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook § 16:8 (2d ed.), citing Dabestani v.

Bel/us, 131 Idaho 542, 961 P.2d 633 (1998) (reversible error to preclude cross-examination about
fact that expert was not provided with party's work product statement to insurance adjuster
concerning accident). Here, the court's refusal to require the state to disclose the expert's
opinions and the facts and data supporting them kept Mr. Koch from effectively cross-examining
the witness about her opinion that children nearly always delay reporting and what factors cause
reporting to occur. This was an important issue in the case because Mr. Koch contended that
C. C. 's disclosure, made some four months after the last alleged incident, was triggered by a
desire to obtain attention from her parents. The state used Ms. Yeager's testimony effectively
during closing arguments to defuse the argument that the delay in disclosure was an indication of
prevarication:
Mydell Yeager came before you. A woman who's been involved in child sexual
abuse cases for 26 years of her life, who makes a career working with children
who have been sexually abused .... And she told you that children will tell when
the intrusiveness of what happened becomes overwhelming .... Mydell Yeager
understands how this sort of level of intrusiveness becomes overwhelming for
young children who experience it.
C[.]'s disclosures and the timing her disclosures, again, it was only when her
mental health was so deteriorating that she had to.
T Vol. III, pg. 73 - pg. 74, In. 3. Thus, the state was able to use Ms. Yeager's testimony to tum
the defense theory of the case upside down. She testified that delayed disclosure was common
and that some children delay disclosure until their humiliation or shame overcomes their
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resistence. Mr. Koch, not having the information needed to attack this line of argument, had
nothing effective to say in response.
Ms. Yeager should have been prohibited from testifying. The expert witness disclosure
from the state was inadequate. Mr. Koch made a proper written request for disclosure prior to
trial, asked the court to enforce compliance with his request and then objected prior to Ms.
Yeager's testimony. Ms. Yeager's testimony was highly damaging to the defense theory. In light
of the above, the Court should vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial.
B.

Tlte Multiple Erroneous Rulings During tlte Trial Deprived Mr. Koclt of a Fair Trial
As will be shown below, during the trial, defense counsel made numerous objections to

prosecutorial misconduct and to the admission of evidence.
1. Error during the state's opening statement
During opening statement, the state said to the jury that "[t]he defendant started talking to
C[.] about things he should have never shared with a 13-year-old girl." This was objected to as
argumentative and that objection was overruled. T pg. 198, In. 16-23.
The comment that Mr. Koch said things which "he should have never shared with a 13year-old girl" was argumentative and the objection should have been sustained. The function of
an opening statement is to inform the jury of the issues of the case and briefly outline the
evidence each litigant intends to introduce to support his allegations or defenses. "Generally,
opening remarks should be confined to a brief summary of evidence counsel expects to introduce
on behalf of his client's case-in-chief. Counsel should not at that time attempt to impeach or
otherwise argue the merits of evidence that the opposing side has or will present." State

v.

Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604, 608 (1975). The prosecutor's comment did not infom1

10

the jury of the issues in the case nor was it a statement of the evidence which it intended to
introduce. Rather it was a judgmental comment intended to prejudice the jurors against Mr.
Koch, was improper and should have been stricken by the court.
2. Evidentiary error during the testimony of Lisa Conn
Lisa Conn is the mother ofC.C. She was asked by the prosecutor ifthere "[w]as a time
that you received an unusual text from the defendant?" That question was objected to, "Judge,
we're going to object to foundation on any text. A text can be -" The court overruled the
objection before defense counsel finished. T pg. 255, In. 14. The court later explained outside
the presence of the jury that it did not like speaking objections. T pg. 256, In. 2-3. Defense
counsel then further explained the basis for his objection:
[A]s far as the foundation for a text, they cannot lay the foundation of a text
through this witness. By its very nature, a text to a phone is in two different hands
and they have to show who is on the other end. In opening statement Mrs. - Ms.
Fisher [the prosecutor] said that C[.] took the phone once to pretend like she was
her mother and texted back. So they cannot lay the proper foundation of text
through this one witness.
T pg. 257, In. 24 - pg. 258, In. 8. The court apparently did not notice or recall that the
prosecutor's question assumed a fact not in evidence, i.e., that it was Mr. Koch who sent the text,
because it overruled the objection again stating, "Simply asking her if she ever received a text is
not a - it's not a lack of foundation." T pg. 258, In. 8.
The prosecutor then asked the witness in the presence of the jury, "And you told us that
you received texts from the defendant?" The witness answered, "Yes." Defense counsel again
objected and was allowed to question in aid of objection. He renewed his foundation objection
after the questions asked established that the witness had no personal knowledge of who was
sending the texts. (Q. "[C]ould you see who was on the other end of that phone with the phone
11

in their hand sending those texts?" A. "No.") Nevertheless, the objection was overruled. T pg.
260, In. 13-21. When the prosecutor asked the question again, the objection was again overruled.
T pg. 262, In. 1-7. The witness then testified that:
The text message said that he was very sorry that C[.] and Tori were no longer
friends, but blamed it all on Tori, that Tori was too clingy and that he wanted to
thank me for allowing them to have been part ofC[.]'s life, that she was an
amazmg young woman.
T pg. 262, In. 10-15. Ms. Conn later testified that she received another text from a number she
didn't recognize. The sender of the text, who identified himself as Michael Koch, wrote that
someone had hacked into his computer, was sending emails under his name and if she had
received an email it didn't come from him. Tpg. 263,ln. 23-pg.265,ln. 5. Defense counsel's
foundation objection was again overruled.
After the jury was excused for the day, the court stated,
On the text message situation. There's sufficient foundation, which is a matter of
discretion for the Court, for it to come in. All these things you're raising, Mr.
Smethers, go to weight and not admissibility and they certainly are subject to
cross-examination and those kinds of things, but they don't prevent those
messages from coming in as long as there is foundation that's been laid and I find
that the foundation that was laid was sufficient for it to come in.
T pg. 270, In. 17- pg. 271, In. 2.
The admission of these text messages was error.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence require "authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility," which "is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." LR.E.
901(a). One example of "authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule" is "[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a
matter is what it is claimed to be." I.R.E. 901 (b)(1).
State v. Joy, No. 38190, 2013 WL 3185264 (Idaho June 25, 2013); see also, State v. Silverson,
130 Idaho 283, 284, 939 P.2d 859, 860 (CL App. 1997). The determination that evidence is
12

supported by a proper foundation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gilpin, 132
Idaho 643, 646, 977 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1999). When a trial court's discretionary decision is
reviewed on appeal, this Court will conduct a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989); State v. Chacon,
145 Idaho 814, 816, 186 P.3d 670, 672 (Ct. App. 2008).
Here, there was not sufficient foundation presented as to the sender of the text messages.
Ms. Conn admitted she did not see who sent the messages. No one else testified to seeing Mr.
Koch send either message. To the contrary, the evidence was that someone who claimed to be
Michael Koch later disavowed sending the first text message, saying that someone had hacked
into his computer and was sending messages under his name. Ms. Conn did not testify that she
recognized the telephone number of the sender during the first or second incident - in fact, she
testified that on the second occasion that she did not recognize the number. T pg. 264, In. 1-7.
Mr. Koch never admitted to sending either the first or second text. Thus, there was no direct
evidence that he was the sender. And there was no circumstantial evidence that he was the
sender of the first email as more than one person would have knowledge of the relationship
between C.C. and his daughter, Tori, which was the subject of that message.
This case is easily distinguishable from State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 190 P.3d 896 (Ct.
App. 2008), review denied, (Aug. 11, 2008), the only Idaho case addressing the foundational
requirements for electronic messages. There, the Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of a
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transcript of an online chat room conversation between an undercover detective posing as a
young girl and someone with a chat room screen name associated with the defendant. The
defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he was the person acting
behind the screen name "letsgetkinky831." The Court of Appeals disagreed given the significant
evidence implicating Glass. In particular, the undercover agent provided "letsgetkinky831" with
the address of a vacant apartment and "letsgetkinky831 " responded that he would be coming
immediately from a short distance away and that he would be arriving in a small, black two-door
car. "Twenty-three minutes later, the detectives witnessed a black two-door car driving into the
apartment complex parking lot .... [and s]hortly thereafter Glass arrived and knocked on the
apartment door where the detectives had set up the sting." State v. Glass, 146 Idaho at 85, 190
P.3d at 904. Here, by contrast, there was no evidence linking Mr. Koch to the first text message
and only that the sender used his name for the second text message.
This case is more like State v. Harris, 358 S.W.3d 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). There, like
here, the foundation for the offered text messages came solely through the testimony of the
recipient. And, like here, the phone owner never testified to anything that tended to establish
who sent the messages. In Harris, "The phone owner testified that one of the messages included
an email address but did not indicate whether that was a signature to the message or whether that
address belonged to Victim." 358 S.W.3d at 176. Here, Ms. Conn testified there was
identification during the first message and admitted that in the second message said that
"Michael Koch" specifically disavowed sending the first text message. Like Harris, "there is
simply not enough in this record to show [who] sent the messages." ld.
In addition, the question of whether sufficient foundation has been presented is not a
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merely an issue to be raised during cross-examination, as stated by the court. Nor does the lack
of foundation only go to the weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the authentication of a text
message is "a condition precedent to its admission." State v. Joy, supra. See a/so, Rodriguez v.

State, 273 P.3d 845,849 (Nev. 2012) (the Nevada Court found 10 of 12 text messages
inadmissible because there was not sufficient foundation to show the defendant sent them. Two
messages were found to be admissible but only because there was bus surveillance video
demonstrating that a co-defendant, with Rodriguez seated next to him and watching, held and
operated the cell phone during the time the messages were sent.). 273 P.3d at 850.
Thus, the court here abused its discretion in admitting the text messages given the total
lack of foundation as to the first text and the near total lack of foundation for the second.
Further, the contents ofthe first text message was prejudicial because it tended to show that Mr.
Koch had an unhealthy attachment to C.C., calling her "an amazing young woman," and blaming
his own daughter for the breakup in the girls' friendship.
3. Evidentiary errors during the testimony of C.C.
Prior to the testimony of C.C., trial counsel renewed his argument that "the state still has
to lay the proper foundation to prove who's on both ends of the text message. And the Court is
the gatekeeper for admissibility and then the jury can consider the weight." T pg. 273, In. 12-17.
The court responded that it would stand by its ruling and "so long as they're able to establish
time, date, the basis of why they believe it was from Mr. Koch, then I'm going to let it in .... But
I will note for the record it is a standing objection. So even if you fail to make it. ... I will
consider that you have made that motion." T pg. 273, In. 23 - pg. 274, In. 8.
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(i) Irrelevant evidence
There would be more testimony about text messages, but, prior to that, the prosecutor
asked the following series of questions.
Q. Okay. And so what were some of the other things that Michael told you about
Salina [his wife]?
A. Sexually?

Q. Yes.
A. That he did not enjoy the way that she would give him a blow job, oral sex.
That she would take his penis -

MR. SMETHERS: We're going to object to relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WI1NESS: - and stick it between her checks and her teeth and rub it back
and forth. And he said that he didn't like it because it hurt him so he would
pretend and say, oh, I'm about to come and then they would actually have regular
intercourse.
T pg. 304, In. 2-17.
"Relevant Evidence" is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable that it
would be without the evidence." LR.E. 401. This Court reviews the question of relevancy in the
admission of evidence de novo. State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 822,215 P.3d 538, 542 (Ct.
App. 2009). This evidence was not relevant because it did not have any "tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable that it would be without the evidence." LR.E.40l. Whether or not Mr. Koch
enjoyed his wife's oral sex techniques has nothing to do with whether he engaged in the acts
alleged in the Indictment and the relevancy objection should have been sustained.
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(ii) Irrelevant evidence within a non-responsive answer
Defense counsel also objected to the following testimony:
Q. Okay. So other than with the exception of finishing up Girl Scouts, did youdid you ever, even see the defendant again?
A. No. I even wouldn't go to Renaissance High School, the high school I had
gotten into, becauseMR. SMETHERS: Objection. Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. SMETHERS: It's nonresponsive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. By MS. FISHER: Did - what was that you were saying aboutA. I had been accepted along with Tori into Renaissance High School and I didn't
go there. I chose not to go because I didn't want to see them. I didn't want to see
Michael or Tori or Salina.
Q. Renaissance High School, is that a special charter school?
A. Uh-huh, yes.
T pg. 333, In. 12 - pg. 334, In. 6.
This evidence is both irrelevant (the basis for the first objection) and non-responsive to
the state's question. Whether or not c.c. decided she couldn't go to her "special" high school
because she might run into a member of the Koch family does not tend to prove any fact of
consequence to the determination of the action.
The court later lectured defense counsel about the use of the non-responsive objection:
Also, one other thing is that - and I'll make sure everyone understands this - the
objection, Mr. Smethers, to a line - a line of questions as nonresponsive is an
objection that cannot be made by the nonquestioning party. And I'll get the case
law for both of you, if you wish to have it, so that you understand that that's what
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the case law specifically says and that why I overruled that objection. So I just
want to put that on the record but I'll give you a copy of the case.
T pg. 342, In. 9-19. However, the court's assertion that the nonquestioning party can never make
a non-responsive objection goes too far. It is actually a matter within the court's sound
discretion. In State ex rei. Rich v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475, 481, 365 P.2d 216, 219-20 (1961), the
appellant argued "that only the examining party can move to strike the answer of a witness as
being unresponsive." The Court responded by noting that "[t]his contention generally is correct,
subject, however, to the inherent power of the trial judge in his sound discretion to control the
progress of the trial to promote the ends of justice. Where the objection by opposing counsel is
directed only to the responsiveness of the answer and not to its general competency, relevancy or
materiality, the motion to strike as not responsive is generally available only to counsel asking
the questions." 83 Idaho 481,365 P.3d 219-220. Here, of course, the objection was to the
relevancy or materiality of the answer so defense counsel had the right to make an objection that
the answer strayed beyond what was asked and into irrelevant territory. Thus, the court had the
authority to permit and grant the objection. 1 This authority was recognized by the Court of
Appeals in State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 857,810 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Ct. App. 1991). In

State ex reI. Rich v. Blair was decided prior to the adoption of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence and was based upon the court's inherent power to control the progress of the trial to
promote the ends of justice. That power still exists. In addition, LR.E. 611(a) empowers and
directs the court to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so to make the interrogation and presentation effective of the
ascertainment of truth. If the trial court was correct and the nonquestioning attorney could never
object to non-responsive answers even when they were not competent, relevant or material,
clever litigants would plan those answers in advance of examination. The questioning attorney
would then ask a prearranged non-objectionable question and the witness would "blurt out" the
preplanned non-responsive answer knowing that the nonquestioning party would have no
recourse. Such a charade would not be in the interests of justice and the ascertainment of truth.
I
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Johnson, the state asked a doctor "what his opinion was based upon, concerning the alleged

abuse of children," but the doctor responded by actually stating his opinion that the children had
been molested. The Court noted that "[h]is opinion was irrelevant to the question asked and thus
was unresponsive" and reversed the conviction. 119 Idaho at 857, 810 P .2d at 1143.
The trial court's ruling here was an abuse of discretion because it failed to perceive the
issue as one of discretion and thus did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
(iii) Foundation for an email and text messages to C. C.

The state was permitted to introduce evidence of an email and several text messages over
the foundation objection ofMr. Koch. First, C.C. testified that she received an email from Mr.
Koch. She said she knew it came from him because she recognized his email address as
"Dolphins Fan something, something." T pg. 337, In. 12-17. Mr. Koch objected to C.C.'s
conclusion that Mr. Koch had sent the email based upon that foundation. The objection was
overruled. T pg. 337, In. 17-19. C. C. testified that Mr. Koch emailed her "asking if my dad was
okay because my dad is a firefighter and there had been an accident with some firefighters[.]" T
pg. 337, In. 22-25. This evidence was important to the state case because it purported to show
that Mr. Koch continued to contact c.c. and attempted to foster a friendly relationship with her
even after the school year ended and C.C. and Tori were no longer friends.
State's Exhibit 17 is a series of photographs showing a text message exchange between

c.c. and someone using Mr. Koch's telephone.

C.C. was permitted to testifY that the sender was

Mr. Koch. T pg. 361, In. 7-21. When the state moved for admission, defense counsel asked the
following questions in aid of objection.
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MR. SMETHERS: ... Were you present on the other end with the person who
made these text message?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to overrule the objection. I know you're
objection is the same as before. I'm overruling it. That's certainly subject to
cross-examination. It goes to weight.
T pg. 363, In. 19 - pg. 364, In. 6. The court admitted the Exhibit. Jd.
Exhibit 17 was highly prejudicial to Mr. Koch. It contains texts allegedly from Mr. Koch
asking "Why do you want to talk to me?" and "Why should I trust this? Exhibits, pg. 11-12.
c.c. responds to the second question, "It sucks to know you don't trust me after everything we
have been thru. Ifmy dad knew we[']d had sex don[']t you think you[']d be dead already?"
Exhibits pg. 12-13. There are also texts stating the sender has "hurt feelings right now" and
protesting that "I have always been genuine to you!" The series ends with an apology, "I am
sorry! You deserve better!" Exhibits pg. 22; 32; 36. The context of the exchange shows that the
sender is upset about the disintegration ofhislher relation with C.C. It also contains an implicit
admission of sexual contact since the sender does not deny having sex with C.C.
The court erred by letting this evidence in. Just as in the case of the text messages sent to
Lisa Conn, there was insufficient foundation for the admission of testimony about the email and
the introduction of Exhibit 17 and the testimony about it. In particular, there was no testimony
by a witness with knowledge that the texts were sent by Mr. Koch. Mr. Koch never admitted to
sending either the email or the texts and no one saw him do so. It is obvious that someone could
be using his computer or telephone. (As noted by defense counsel, C.c. testified that she
answered a text message which was sent to her brother's telephone. C.C. said in the return
message that she was her mom and that the sender shouldn't try to make any further contact with
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"my kids." T pg. 339, In. 2-9. It was Tori, using her father's telephone, who sent the text to
c.c.'s brother. TVol. II, pg. 153, In. 14-25. Thus the evidence was that both c.c. and Tori had
used other people's telephones to send messages.) The determination that there was proper
foundation was inconsistent with LR.E. 901 because there was no evidence Mr. Koch was the
sender. Further, the court simply gave up its role as the gatekeeper as to the admissibility of
evidence by ruling that Mr. Koch's objections merely went to the weight of the evidence and
could be brought up during cross-examination. Thus, its rulings were an abuse of discretion
under State v. Hedger, supra., and State v. Chacon, supra.
(iv) Non-responsive answer by c.c. during cross-examination

The court erroneously overruled the following objection made when defense counsel was
cross-examining C.C.
Q. [MR. SMETHERS] ... So you were laying on the bathroom floor and crying?
A. No. He told me to take a bath in Tori's bedroom because he's very adamant
about douching and things after you have sex, so --

MR. SMETHERS: Okay. Judge, we would object as non-responsive.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR.SMETHERS: - move to strike, admonish the jury.
THE COURT: No. I'm going to overrule the objection.
The court goes on to say, in the presence of the jury, she's answering your question, Mr.
Smethers. She corrected that he asked her - she's answering your question. So I'm not sure
what you're objecting to." T pg. 423, In. 21 - pg. 425, In. 7.
However, it is obvious that C.c.' s testimony about Mr. Koch being "very adamant
about douching and things after you have sex" is not responsive to the question, "So you were
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laying on the bathroom floor and crying?" The objection should have been sustained.
4. Evidentiary errors during the testimony of Salina Koch
Salina Koch is the wife of Michael and mother of Tori. She was called by the state to
testifY. In large part, the state asked Ms. Koch about statements she had made during an
interview with Detective McGilvery around the time ofMr. Koch's arrest. T pg. 638, In. 14 - pg.
671, In. 18. One of the questions asked, over defense objection, was whether she recalled,
"explaining to Detective McGilvery that if Michael had been happy in your relationship, that he
wouldn't have done anything?" T pg. 666, In. 4-8. Defense counsel had previously objected to a
similar question and was overruled. T pg. 665, In. 18-21. The prosecutor re-asked the question
after a sidebar. T pg. 665, In. 22 - pg. 666, In. 3. Ms. Koch answered, "I do remember that
comment, yes, ma'am." T pg. 666, In. 9.
The court erred by overruling defense counsel's objection. This evidence is not relevant
to any material issue in the case. Ms. Koch's belief that ifher husband sought comfort from
C.C., it must have been due to unhappiness in their marriage has nothing to do with a fact of
consequence in this case. The lack of relevance is even more pronounced when Ms. Koch told
the court that she only made that statement after Detective McGilvery told her that he was" 100
percent sure" that Mr. Koch was guilty, but now she believed Mr. Koch to be innocent. T pg.
666, In. 10-14. The court erred by admitting that irrelevant evidence.
5. Evidentiary errors during the testimony of Christopher McGilvery
(i) Improper impeachment with prior statements

Christopher McGilvery is a detective with the Meridian Police Department. He was
permitted to testify to his recollection of prior statements made to him by Salina Koch. The jury
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was instructed this testimony was for impeachment purposes only. T Vol. II, pg. 41, In. 19-25.
However, in some instances the state elicited testimony about statements which were not
denied by Ms. Koch. For example, the detective was asked "whether or not [Ms. Koch] recalled
talking to C[.] about her concerns that something was going on between C[.] and Michael?" The
defense objection to this question was overruled and he answered, "Yes." The detective was then
asked, "What did she say about that?" He answered, "[S]he to a degree, danced around that
question. She told me at times that she had thought about that." Defense objected again and was
overruled. T Vol. II, pg. 43, In. 19 - pg. 44, In. 8.
The admission of this evidence was error. "Under LR.E. 613(a), inconsistent out-of-court
statements may be used to impeach a witness' trial testimony. Such statements are not excluded
as hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of any of the facts asserted, but rather, solely
to impeach the credibility ofthe witness." State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 248,880 P.2d 771, 778
(Ct. App. 1994). As Ms. Koch never denied making the statement above, she could not be
impeached with her prior statement. It was not inconsistent with her testimony. "To be
admissible for impeachment purposes evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement must
be relevant to the witness's trial testimony." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219, 245 P.3d 961,
971 (2010). As the prior statement related by the detective was not inconsistent with the trial
testimony of Ms. Koch, it was not admissible under LR.E. 613(a). See T pg. 629, In. 17 - pg.
681, In. 11 (testimony of Salina Koch).
The same is true regarding the detective's testimony that Ms. Koch "said that ... she had
suspicions that something was going on, but she wasn't for sure what." T Vol. II. 3-11. The
objection to this testimony should have been sustained because Ms. Koch was never asked about,
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nor did she deny ever making that statement. Thus it was not a prior inconsistent statement
under LR.E. 613(a). See T pg. 629, In. 17 - pg. 681, In. 11 (testimony of Salina Koch).

(ii) Inadequate foundation for the recorded telephone call
Detective McGilvery also testified that he assisted in setting up a confrontation call on
October 6,2011. He placed a device on C.C.'s telephone which recorded the telephone call she
made. T Vol. II, pg. 32, In. 2-24. The state then presented the following as foundation for the
recording.
Q. Then did you made a recording of that?

A. Yes, I did.
Q. And after listening to that recording, were you able to listen to it in its entirety
to ensure the entire phone call was captured and that it was - well that the entire
phone call was captured?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Had you had an opportunity to review the phone call in this case?

A. Yes, I have.

Q.... That phone call that you had, was it since transferred to a CD?
A. Yes.
Q. And then that CD downloaded onto a CD for discovery in this case?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Is the phone call that was downloaded from that CD that had been made into a
CD been processed for the purposes of the state, is it true and accurate?

A. Yes.
MS. FISHER: The state would move for the admission - well I'm going to mark
that, excuse me, as Exhibit 19.
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(Plaintiff Exhibit 19 marked)
MS. FISHER: And the state would move for the admission of the confrontation call.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SMETHERS: Yes, Judge. A question in aid of objection?
THE COURT: Yes.
OFFICER: Had you ever met Michael Koch before this call?
THE WITNESS: No, I had not.
MR. SMETHERS: Were you present at the other end in the room with the person talking
on the phone?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I was.
MR. SMETHERS: I mean, the person who was allegedly Michael Koch on the other end?
THE WITNESS: No, I was in Meridian.
MR. SMETHERS: Judge, we'll object to foundation.
THE COURT: Overruled.
T Vol. II, pg. 32, In. 23 - pg. 34, In. 22. Earlier in the trial, C.C. testified that she spoke to Mr.
Koch on the telephone in October and that the detectives and the victim-witness coordinator were
present. She was never asked to identifY which detectives were with her during the recordings.
Nor did she identifY Exhibit 19 as the recording of that call or testifY that the person she called
was the person speaking on Exhibit 19. T pg. 357, In. 12 - pg. 358, In. 23.
Again, there was insufficient foundation. C.C. testified there was a recorded telephone
call but never testified that the recording introduced as Exhibit 19 was the conversation between
her and Mr. Koch. The detective was unable to identifY the male voice in Exhibit 19 as Mr.
Koch. Consequently, the foundation objection should have been sustained and Exhibit 19 should
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not have been admitted.
The introduction of Exhibit 19 was highly prejudicial to Mr. Koch because the state used
the recording to great effect during closing argument. For example, the state argued:
• " even after that phone call where C [.] is confronting him, confronting him about
the nature of the sexual relationship that he got her into ... he's not hanging up,
he's not telling her C[.], you are crazy; C[.], I didn't do this, what are you talking
about?" T VoL III, pg. 82, In. 22 - pg. 83, In. 5.
• "The confront call is very important." T VoL III, pg. 84, In. 24-25.
• "And C[.] said, 'I didn't tell her anything.' And the defendant says, 'I know
what you said and I so very much appreciate that.' What are we talking about
here?" T Vol. III, pg. 85, In. 11-15.
• "C[.] says, 'Was it just sex for you?' And what's his response? 'No.' And she
immediately says, 'It wasn't?' And he says, 'No.' Not, C[.], you're crazy. What
are you talking about? That is the response that a 38-, 39-year-old man would
have if a 13-year-old-girl was accusing of having sex and you didn't do that." T
Vol. III, pg. 85, In. 23 - pg. 86, In. 5.
• "So if you think it's being recorded, Salina's on the other end of the phone and
this is what she's telling you, then where is your denability [verbatim]? Where is
your outrage? ... We're talking about having sex with a 13-year-old-child.
Where is his moral indignation?" T Vol. III, pg. 86, In. 16 - pg. 87, In. 2.
In light of the above, the Court should vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial
on this error alone as the state cannot prove the erroneous admission of Exhibit 19 was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt as required by State v. Joy, supra.
C.

Tlte Cumulative Effect of tlte Above Errors Deprived Mr. Koclt of a Fair Trial

The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which
by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process. State v. Field, 144 Idaho
559,572-73,165 P.3d 273, 286-87 (2007); State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784,803-04,932 P.2d 907,
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926-27 (Ct. App. 1997). In order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that
there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors, when
aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171,983 P.2d
233,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
As argued above, the admission of the testimony of Mydell Yeager was so prejudicial that
reversal is required. The same is is true regarding the admission of the text messages and of the
admission of Exhibit 19. But even if that were not the case, the prejudicial effect of all the errors
above requires the Court to conclude that the state cannot meet its burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result absent the errors. Therefore,
reversal of the convictions and a remand for a new trial is still required. State v. Field, supra.

V. CONCLUSION
The error in admitting Mydell's Yeager's testimony was not harmless as it substantially
undermined the theory of defense. The multiple trial and evidentiary errors were also not
harmless. In particular, the state's evidence of the emails, text messages and the audio recording
should not have been admitted. Without that evidence, the state's case was based on the
testimony of the complaining witness, who had a motive to lie about the alleged abuse. As there
were no witnesses and no forensic evidence supporting her story, the state cannot meet its burden
of proving the errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court should reverse the
conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this
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